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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to establish which conception of a legitimate European Union the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter, ‘the Draft’)1 speaks to. We consider this paper
as a further contribution to a collective research project on the European Union, which undertakes a
broad-based empirical and normative analysis of the process of European integration (the CIDEL re-
search project).2 Our specific aim is to undertake an empirical and normative analysis of the Laeken re-
form process, which complements a previous essay where we dealt with the constitution-making
procedure followed in Laeken, and compared it both to previous Treaty amendment procedures and to a
normative standard of democratic constitution-making.3 In this paper, we focus on the impact that the
substantive provisions contained in the Draft Treaty could have on the ordinary democratic decision-
making procedures once the text enters into force. That is, we try to determine, by means of looking at
certain concrete components of the substantive contents of the Draft how law-making will be structured
in the Union (if it is organized according to the Draft), and based on this try to infer what type of entity
the Draft propounds, as well as which mode of legitimacy it endorses. 
In more concrete terms, we consider a range of markers, six in all (out of which four have here been
applied to the Draft).4 We see these as key indicators for discerning the structure of democratic proce-
dures, both in terms of how deliberation and decision-making proceed, as well as with regard to the sub-
stantive contents that laws are expected to uphold and develop. These indicators or markers are also
useful for shedding light on the nature of the entity and its democratic legitimacy. The specific ‘markers’
which we will be considering are: 
• the distribution of competences;
• the law-making process; 
• fundamental rights; 
• the underlying conception of cultural community; 
Two caveats are in order. First, any assessment of this kind is complicated by the fact that the Euro-
pean Union is both a contested entity and an ‘entity in motion’.5 In response to this, we apply the three-
fold characterization of the European Union shared by CIDEL researchers (problem-solving, value-
based or rights-based) to the text, to see which one fits best. Each such conception yields an explicit set
of principles, institutional-constitutional configurations, policy instruments, modes of allegiance, and
conceptions of how a legitimate EU is forged. Thus, we tackle the problem of plural characterizations of
the Union by means of presenting and evaluating the draft in relation to the three legitimation strategies
listed above.6 It seems to us that even if the three conceptions can be neatly distinguished for analytical
purposes, any appropriate description of what the European Union is and what it should be necessarily
requires combining elements from the three conceptions. The key question is how they should be com-
1. Approved 18 June, 2004; formally signed 29 October, 2004; and currently awaiting ratification in all the Member States.
2. For further information on the project contact the authors or consult: http://www.arena.uio.no/CIDEL
3. The Constitution’s Gift’, forthcoming in European Law Journal, 2005.
4. Our dealing with four only is simply due to time and space constraints.
5. E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum (eds) Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, London:
Routledge, 2000.
6. On the strategies, see J.E. Fossum ‘Constitution-making in the European Union’ in Eriksen and Fossum, eds, supra, fn 5,
PAGES; E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum, ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed’, 25 (2004)
International Political Science Review, pp. 435—59. John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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bined.7 This approach permits us to establish not only what kind of polity the Union is, but also how it
has become what it is, and to speculate (not to predict) how it might get transformed in the future.8 Sec-
ond, the very labeling of the Draft as ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ reflects the Union’s
ambiguous and contested character. These traits invariably rub off on the process and on the outcome:
Is the Draft actually a constitution; is it a treaty; or is it some kind of a mixture? In this article we take
as a guiding assumption that to characterize the Draft as a constitution is at least within the range of cur-
rent conceptual and normative possibilities. Whether it is the most adequate one in both descriptive and
normative terms, taking into account the constitution-making process and the substance of the Draft,
must be established in light of the fact that there are different conceptions of the European Union qua
political community. This amounts to saying that the type of political community we find the Union to
be has clear and obvious implications for which constitution it should have. 
This article is structured in three parts. First, we spell out the three basic conceptions of legitimacy
and apply these to the Union. From this application we derive more specific expectations on what con-
cerns the substantive contents of the European constitutional edifice that each such application espouses.
That is, we ask ourselves what a legitimate European constitution will look like from the vantage-points
of the problem-solving, the value-based and the rights-based conceptions of the European Union. Sec-
ond, we analyze the actual contents of the Draft, with specific attention to the issues listed above. Third,
we discuss what our findings yield in terms of designating the Union’s status in polity terms. The last
part holds the conclusion.
7. Indeed, claiming that the three conceptions are unnecessary because the Union as an empirical reality is 
a mix of the three is a rather harmless criticism. What we claim is that the sharp distinction of three the-
oretical models provides analytical clarity, and that the key question is how the relationship between 
the problem-solving, value basis and rights foundations of the Union are related. This dramatically 
depending on which conception is considered to be prevalent. In that regard, we favour their combina-
tion under the general framework of the third conception of the Union as a rights-based polity. 
8. We reject any deterministic interpretation of our claims. In our view, political agency can potentially 
transform the Union in any conceivable direction, from its transformation into a federal polity to its dis-
solution. Having said that, one can speculate about the likely shape of the Union in view of the previ-
ous dynamics of the process of integration, which lead to paths of least resistance, stemming from the 
institutional inertias and from the growth of civil and political structures. 7
I. Three Conceptions of a Legitimate European Polity: 
Which Substantive Notion of the Constitution
Is Associated With Each?
A) The problem-solving conception
This strategy conceives of the EU as a functional organization that is set up to address pragmatic prob-
lems which the member states cannot resolve when acting independently. The Union is mandated to act
only within a delimited range of fields.9 A critical determinant for establishing which fields is the EU’s
ability to offload and compensate for the declining problem-solving ability of the nation-state in a glo-
balizing context.
This conception sees the Union’s legitimacy as based on two components. In performance terms, it
claims legitimacy due to its ability to produce substantive outcomes, i.e. output legitimacy.10 This per-
tains in particular to its ability to handle cross-border issues (such as for instance environmental, migra-
tion and cross-border crime). Thus, the problem-solving strategy is based on a consequentialist notion
of legitimacy. In democratic terms, the Union’s legitimacy is derived from the democratic character of
the Member States, as they retain core decision-making power within the Union’s institutional struc-
ture.11 Delegation of competencies to the Union entails self-binding, and this comes with a powerful set
of controls in the hands of the Member States, so as to safeguard that the Member States remain the foun-
dation of the EU’s democratic legitimacy. The member states authorize EU action and confine and de-
limit the EU’s range of operations through the provisions set out in the treaties, as well as through a set
of institutions that permit each and one of them to exercise veto-power, either individually or aggrega-
tively.12 
A problem-solving conception of the Union is associated with an instrumental, functional approach
to the Union’s legal order. The problem-solving conception envisions EU law to be of a Treaty-based
character, which corresponds to intergovernmental principles. However, for the Union to serve as an ef-
fective problem-solver, its legal order has to be grounded on a set of legal norms of material constitu-
9. This  description  is shared by intergovernmentalists, neo-functionalists and regulatory scholars (A. Moravcsik,
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, 31 (1993) Journal of
Common Market Studies, pp. 473—524; id., The Choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to
Maastricht, London: UCL Press, 1998; E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958;
P.C. Schmitter, ‘Neo-neo-functionalism: Déjà vu all over again?’, in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds) European Integration
Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; G. Majone, Regulating Europe, London: Routledge, 1996), albeit they
differ in their analysis of the causal mechanisms behind integration and the normative  basis of the process. Thus,
intergovernmentalists would claim that Member States are the main agents of integration, and that the Union is justified
when serving the interests of its Member States. Regulatory variants would stress that the legitimacy of EU institutions and
legal norms would be based on performance – output legitimacy (F.W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and
Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Majone, Regulating Europe; id. ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”:
The Question of Standards’, 4 (1998) European Law Journal, pp. 5—28). 
10. Hellen Wallace, ‘Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC’, in Soledad García (ed.) European Identity
and the Search for Legitimacy, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 100; Fritz Scharpf, Governing Europe, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999. 
11. The strategy presumes that it is possible to distinguish between input and output legitimation, and further that the mode of
legitimation that the EU itself can draw on is that of output legitimation (Scharpf, Governing in Europe). In input
democratic terms, the EU can not claim to be legitimate. 
12.QMV as an instance of collective veto, because it is not simple majority.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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tional nature, which ensure a modicum of autonomy to its legal order. This entails that the Union has a
material constitution, which regulates the production of legal norms and sorts out conflicts between
norms within specifically delineated realms of action. This material constitution is, however, enshrined
in an international treaty, as there is no need for a formal, procedurally approved constitution. To put it
differently, the proponents of this conception of the EU are not overly concerned with the direct demo-
cratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process; their main concern is with the material norms
which frame the EU legal order and ensure the power position of Member States. Their concern is to get
the correct set of decision-making norms in place; not how they are deliberated and decided upon. This
leads problem-solving conceptions into depicting the Laeken constitution-making process as another in-
stance of Treaty amendment as we know it, and to be deeply disinterested in the question as to whether
this entails a moment of constitutional significance or not.
First, the legal order of a problem-solving Union will be established on the basis of a flexible and
open allocation of competencies to the Union, within the confined set of issues designated as relevant to
Union action.13 Thus, the Union has enumerated powers, but their determination is left, as much as pos-
sible, to the Member States, and is not subject to procedural or substantive requirements besides the re-
quirement of agreement among Member States. This allows Member States to increase or decrease the
realm of Union action in relation to the set of problems to be solved, or to be sorted out, at the Union
level.14
Second, the problem-solving conception of the European Union presupposes an efficient and expe-
dient law- and decision-making process at the Union level. This requires the constitution to assign deci-
sion-making roles both to the Member States and to the Union institutions. The reason for assigning
decision-making roles to the latter is a) to increase the specialised or technical knowledge basis of the
decision (knowledge-enhancing), and/or b) to facilitate decision-making by means of finding and pro-
posing solutions likely to be accepted by Member States (efficiency-enhancing). The Union has delegat-
ed powers (as we have just seen), but the ultimate decision-making power rests with the Member States.
This is ensured in different ways, depending on the scope and intensity of the common action. In some
areas, Member States retain national veto power, and the role of European institutions is confined to
making proposals. In other areas, Member States’ veto power can only be exercised jointly, and is
matched by an equal veto power granted to Union institutions. Finally, the institutions of the Union have
exclusive decision-making power in a very limited number of fields.15 Which of these is the right oper-
ationalisation depends on the will of the Member States, and on the need for rendering their commitment
to Union action credible.
Third, the material constitution of a problem-solving Union would include those fundamental rights
whose protection at the European level is considered as instrumental to the Union’s problem-solving
ability, on efficiency or expediency grounds. The protection of economic freedoms empowers persons,
especially legal persons, to become decentralised guardians of European Union law.16 Moreover, the
protection of certain rights may also be considered necessary to ensure the social legitimacy of the insti-
tutional structure or of the substantive norms that are essential to problem-solving. A good example in
that regard could be data protection norms, which facilitate the free flow of data across borders by means
of reassuring citizens that their fundamental rights are protected at the same time. The enshrinement and
protection of political, citizenship rights, is not a functional necessity, and these remain entrenched and
exercised at the national level.
Fourth, from the material constitution of a problem-solving Union we would be able to discern an
economic constitution with a clear distinction between questions of redistribution, which would be the
competence of nation-states (and regions), and questions of regulation, which would concern the alloca-
13. In other words, there would be explicit limits on the problem-solving entity’s ability to deal with for instance security and
defence matters, as these are considered core state tasks.
14. Such rhetoric is evident in the calls to repatriate competencies that were already transferred to the European Union.
15. The material constitution should determine, in a rather flexible way, the requisite majority of Member States that is needed
to adopt a piece of legislation or to take a decision. However, in line with the above, majoritarian decision-making would
be explicitly mandated (through national veto) and justified with reference to expediency. Extensions in the range of issues
handled by the Union thus reflect the Member States’ increased commitment to the common organisation.
16. J. Coppel. and A. O'Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?’, 29 (1992) Common Market Law
Review, pp. 669—92.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
9
tion of the costs and benefits of maintaining the Union’s institutions and the common action norms
among the Member States.17 That is, questions of distributive justice would be dealt with at the European
level from a purely technical, regulatory, standpoint to ensure at the same time the efficiency of national
systems, without pre-determining their core political choices.
Fifth, the material constitution of a problem-solving Union could be expected to be rather circum-
scribed on cultural issues. It will affirm the respect for national and regional identities and provide safe-
guards for their retention. Consistent with the characterization of the EU as a functional organization,
the only necessary cement of the Union, so to say, is its problem-solving ability. There is no need for
forging and renewing a ‘we-feeling’ among European citizens, as the Union is confined to deal with
pragmatic issues.
Sixth, the procedural rights guaranteed to physical and legal persons in the process of application of
Union law should be those necessary to ensure the ongoing commitment on the part of Member States
to a common organization and legal system. The protection of procedural guarantees turns (natural or
legal) persons into decentralised monitoring agents for national compliance with Union law.18 This
might also require granting individual rights limited rights to contest compliance of Union legislation
with basic Treaty principles. 
B) The Value-based conception
The value-based community notion conceives of the EU as an emulator of the nation-state.19 This con-
ceptualization portrays the Union as a political community based on a set of ethical values, shared by
European citizens on the basis of pre-political factors, typically embedded in a common culture.20 As
such, the EU is an entity to which Europeans should demonstrate their allegiance. It presupposes that
they will shift their ultimate loyalty to the EU when the nation-building process has been completed. A
common identity, this strategy posits, not only helps to stabilize the Union’s goals and visions, but is also
necessary for securing trust.21 
The EU’s legitimacy basis, from this perspective, emanates from the community of values that the
EU draws upon. These common values underpin and render possible democratic decision-making at the
European level. They are the preconditions for European democracy. Thus, value-based conceptions
tend to underpin a democratic conception of legitimacy, but one that is grounded on that community’s
particular set of common ethical values. This entails substantive limits on the agenda and on what are
seen as acceptable outcomes of democratic decision-making. This strategy is based on a contextual mode
of rationality and depicts the EU as an emerging value community.
The value-based conception requires the Union to have a constitution that symbolizes and reflects
the existence of a European community of values. Thus, the constitution is a ‘rooted’ constitution, i.e.,
a body of fundamental norms with deep roots in the pre-political community of values. To put it differ-
ently, the constitution is the legal embodiment of the community of values. As such, it is best seen as an
evolutionary constitution, which is distilled from such socio-cultural roots over a considerable period of
time.22 The constitution-making process critically contributes to the clarification of the Union’s value
basis. It is better understood as a collective process of self-interpretation, through which it becomes clear
17. This also reflects a distinction between commutative and distributive justice concerns.
18. Chris Harding, ‘Who goes to Court in Europe?’ 17 (1992) European Law Review, pp. 105-95.
19. This is, in our view, compatible with a republican interpretation of the Union’s value basis. 
20. According to communitarians, being a citizen is not a mere act of will, but something which is rendered possible by the
pre-politically sharing of ‘something’ (i.e. a ‘culture’); turning individuals into next of kin predisposed to make sacrifices
for others. (J. Benda, Discours à la nation européenne, Paris: Gallimard, 1993; cf. J.H.H. Weiler , Un’Europa Cristiana,
Milano: Rizzoli, 2003)
21. Trust is an essential condition for deep and binding cooperation and for the settlement of conflicts by neutral procedures
(R. Schmalz-Bruns, ‘On the political theory of the Euro-polity’, forthcoming in E.O. Eriksen, ed., Making the European
Polity: Reflexive integration in the EU, London: Routledge, 2005). A critical source of trust is a common cultural substrate,
which can help foster allegiance and respect for laws. Cf. C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985; Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989; D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’, 1 (1995) European Law Journal, pp. 282—302;
D. Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; M.J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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who are Europeans and also who they want to be. Consequently, constitution-making has to reach back
in time, and establish that there is a set of common traditions and memories that can be seen as constitu-
tive of Europe. These must then be revitalized and brought to the fore to support the constitution-making
process. It has to reach into people’s hearts and passions, and reinforce their sense of selves as compa-
triots, willing to embrace collective obligations essential to each other’s well-being.23 Thus, the contents
of the constitution have to extend beyond institutional design.
First, the constitution of the value-community espouses the principle that the distribution of compe-
tencies should follow core community traits. With this is meant that all competencies which are central
to the forging and maintenance of the Union as a nation-state should be located at the central level. In
other words, because the Union as value-community can only be sustained through a system of defense,
a system of redistribution of economic resources, and a system of cultural maintenance, these competen-
cies should be allocated at the Union level. Nations and regions could have auxiliary competences on
what concerns the regulatory and administrative implementation of such policies. On other issues, com-
petencies can be shared among all relevant levels of government.
Second, it expects the Constitution to delineate law and decision-making procedures in which active
citizens can be socialized into Union common values. This requires combining citizen participation at
the European, national and regional levels. Citizens’ involvement at all levels of government is needed
in order to ensure the sustenance of an active community of values, and to ensure that citizens internalize
such values. This entails majoritarian decision-making procedures, in which representative Union insti-
tutions have the final say. But this is to be combined with multiple veto points, which ensure sub-com-
munities and protect the central institutions from being overloaded.
Third, the value-community’s Constitution will contain a catalogue of fundamental rights placing
equal emphasis on fundamental rights and on fundamental duties, as both, and especially the latter, are
reflective of the common value basis that bonds citizens together. The constitution will also draw a clear
line between rights of citizens and of non-citizens. Similarly, it will delineate law and decision-making
procedures that ensure citizens’ active political participation, so as to sustain the Community’s value ba-
sis and sense of self. Given the Union’s sheer size, this requires procedures for active participation at all
key levels: European, national and regional. But given that these are also in some sense distinct commu-
nities; there will also be a multitude of potential veto points, so as to ensure communal allegiance, as
well as to protect against trans-communal transgressions.
Fourth, the Constitution will frame a socio-economic order which is reflective of citizens’ mutual
obligations, of what they owe to each other as members of a value-based community. Consequently,
there should be a strong element of redistribution at the European level, which will reflect Europeans’
allegiance to the Union. This ensures the necessary we-feeling – required for sustaining the community
– and that also has to be forged and renewed on a continuous basis, for this to constitute a value-com-
munity. 
Fifth, it expects the Constitution to contribute to the fostering of a strong European identity. The
Constitution itself should be turned into a symbol of the political community, and for such a purpose, it
should make explicit reference to the common symbols and to the Union’s foundation as a community
of fate. The Constitution will contain provisions to ensure the ongoing socialisation of persons into ‘Eu-
ropeans’; there would be a set of clearly delineated criteria for who are Europeans, and who are not; and
these criteria would reflect cultural aspects and a common identity. The onus would be on positively
identifying Europe, and distinguishing Europeans from others, rather than on what Europeans have in
common with others.
22. F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; B. Leoni, Freedom and the Law,
expanded 3rd edition, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991; see also H. Brunkhorst, ‘A polity without a state? European
constitutionalism between evolution and revolution’, in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menéndez (eds) Developing a
Constitution for Europe, London: Routledge, 2004; C. Möllers, ‘Verfassung – Verfassunggebung – Konstitutionalisierung’,
in A. von Bogdandy (ed.) Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Berlin: Springer, 2003.
23. If there is no common pre-political identity, it has to be created. Constitution making in this perspective is not only a
forward looking creative act where the main task is to establish a set of institutions that shape the ensuing community.
Constitution making is as much a backward looking creative act, in the sense that certain aspects of the past are made
explicit and attributed normative value. History is interpreted in the light of amplifying those traits that speak to a common
sense of origin and a common sense of destiny. The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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Sixth, the value-based Constitution is unlikely to constitutionalise procedural rights, even less to
grant the same constitutional status as the one given to political rights. This is so to the extent that polit-
ical procedures, not courts, should play a central role in the definition of common action norms in line
with the founding values of the community. Thus, the value-based conception is extremely skeptical of
entrenching procedural guarantees which entail the judicial review of legislation, be it European or na-
tional, as this entails empowering courts to the detriment of political processes. Such rights are seen as
having the potential to undermine the Union’s value-basis.
C) The rights-based conception
The rights-based notion conceives of the European Union as a political community based on the citizens’
mutual acknowledgment of their rights and duties. The Union is considered as the supranational level of
government in Europe, and as one of the regional subsets of a larger cosmopolitan order.24 The Union,
in its internal make-up, is federally structured.25
In a globalizing world, the nation-states suffer particularly pronounced democratic deficits, in that
their citizens are affected by decisions taken outside the borders, and beyond national control. This un-
derpins the case for supranational government. But to re-establish democracy, the new level of govern-
ment must itself meet with the requisite standards of democratic legitimacy. From the vantage-point of
this model, such standards refer to the rights of citizens to participate in the deliberation and decision-
making processes through which common action norms are established. Applied to the EU, laws adopted
and decisions taken at the European level deeply affect citizens. This presupposes that the Union’s dem-
ocratic legitimacy be based on the democratic credentials of its decision-making procedures and on its
protection of fundamental rights. The rights-based strategy is founded on the notion that the Union’s
democratic legitimacy is based on citizens who see themselves, not only as the addresses, but also, as the
authors, of the law.26 Further, the rights-based notion also presupposes a public sphere steeped in and
upheld by the essential conditions of freedom, inclusion, equality, participation, and open agenda. Its
support resides in a constitutional patriotism,27 where a set of legally entrenched fundamental rights and
democratic procedures, are embedded within a particular socio-cultural context, so as to make for polit-
ical affect and identification. This strategy rests on the moral value of deliberation; it propounds a rights-
based, procedural notion of legitimation.
Having said that, the rights-based conception of the Union is entirely compatible with the notion of
the Union as also set up to ensure problem-solving. A political community is established not only to en-
sure the mutual acknowledgment of rights, but clearly also to pursue policies, which include solving all
kinds of problems, normative, ethical and prudential. In short, legitimacy bereft of efficiency is hardly
any legitimacy at all. The main difference between the first and the third conceptions lies in the latter’s
claim to the effect that problem-solving should proceed within a constitutional framework for reasons
both normative and prudential. The former, problem-solving notion’s concern with the legitimacy of the
specific solutions provided, then, can only be guaranteed if framed by and decided within a constitution-
ally established democratic decision-making process. The latter speaks to the stability of the arrange-
ments, which can only be guaranteed within a properly established democratic constitutional order. A
similar line of reasoning applies to the question as to whether the rights-based model claims that the mu-
24. The Union would occupy an intermediate position between the United Nations and nation-states as a regional political
community. As such, the European Union should be regarded as a political community part of a cosmopolitan order (cf.
E.O. Eriksen, A Cosmopolitan Europe in the Making? Working Paper 2/04, Madrid: Instituto Universitario de
Investigación Ortega y Gasset, 2004).
25. Note that there is no requirement for a federal entity to be a state. Cf. D.J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa,
University of Alabama Press, 1987.
26. A central tenet of discourse-theory is that only those norms that are approved in free and open debate are valid (J.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1996, p. 107).
27. J. Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, in A. Gutmann and C. Taylor (eds)
Multiculturalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; id., The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; id., The Postnational Constellation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001; id.,
‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictionary Principles’, 29 (2001) Political Theory, pp. 766—
81.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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tual acknowledgment of rights is sufficient to ensure the stability of the European political community.
It seems to us that the only appropriate shorthand answer is no, as is also reflected in the very notion of
constitutional patriotism: a set of fundamental rights and democratic procedures that are steeped within
a particular context. There is thus a need for some ethical identity, some kind of we-feeling that is also
supportive of democratic decision-making procedures.28 The main difference with the second model
concerns the extent to which such ethical values are expected to be subject to normative, critical reflex-
ive analysis, with the rights-based conception claiming that such ethical values cannot serve as a set of
given contextual or pre-political elements and hence be exempted from criticism from a moral stand-
point.
The rights-based conception of the Union sees the constitution as reflecting the fundamental legal
norms of the European Union, approved by European citizens in a process with reinforced democratic
qualities (relative to ordinary law-making).29
As a consequence, the constitution must uphold a set of rights that enable participation in opinion-
and will- formation processes, and thus make for public autonomy (i.e. political rights), as well as a set
of rights that protect the integrity of the individual, her private autonomy. The two sets of autonomy pre-
suppose each other and are mutually dependent on each other. To ensure this, the constitution also has
to contain a set of institutions that realize the public and private autonomies of citizens. 
This also presupposes a democratic constitution-making process; ‘revolutionary’ in the sense of
forging and reflecting the common will of citizens.30 The rights-based conception presupposes that the
constitution is forged through a ‘constitutional moment’31, a process with an explicit democratic sanc-
tion. Constitution-making permits citizens to see themselves as the addressees and also as the authors of
the laws that affect them. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the European constitution is critically depend-
ent on the EU harharnessing the normative essence of the modern democratic constitution, which essen-
tially corresponds to the protection of fundamental rights.
First, the rights-based Constitution is expected to lay the ground for an allocation of competences
among different levels of government that ensures that each level retains decision-making capacity over
those issues that mainly concern its citizens; at the same time that it ensures the political influence and
relevance of each level of government, which is a basic pre-condition for ensuring active political par-
ticipation. The criteria of allocation of competences could be flexible, but their reform should be subject
to procedural and substantive limits, i.e., the criteria need to be properly constitutionalised.
Second, the rights-based Constitution is expected to delineate a law and decision-making procedure
that is such set up as to ensure that legal norms and concrete decisions can be supported by the common
will of European citizens.32 This entails designing a law-making procedure that assigns a decision-mak-
ing role to institutions that are representative of the will of European citizens, so as to ensure that deci-
sions are responsive to social demands. This presupposes a procedure that is sensitive to concerns in the
various European public spheres, that is, mutual interaction between strong and general publics.33 This
implies a majoritarian decision-making procedure, in which veto power rests exclusively with citizens
through their European or national representative institutions.34
Third, the rights-based Constitution will include a catalogue of fundamental rights that is reflective
of and that amplifies the commitments entrenched in the Member States' constitutions of the indivisibil-
ity of fundamental rights (including civic, political, but also social and economic rights). As such, the
catalogue should reflect the rights that European citizens mutually acknowledge each other as citizens,
and which constitute the core precondition for European democracy. Those rights should be equally pro-
28. The question of the relationship between a normatively grounded democratic constitutional order and an ethical we-feeling
is indeed a complex one. But the problem as such is relevant to both the nation-state and the European Union context.
29. Ackerman’s dual conception of democracy is related to the need to distinguish between the Constitution and ordinary
statutes (We the People: Foundations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991; and We the People:
Transformations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
30. H. Arendt, On Revolution, London: Faber and Faber, 1963; B. Ackerman, ‘Revolution on a Human Scale. (Moments of
Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism)’, June (1999) Yale Law Journal. 
31. Even though ‘moment’ is the usual term, it actually refers to a process.
32. This requires that law and decision making procedures will block initiatives that are supported by sectional interests, i.e.,
are not representative of the common interest of Europeans (that is, procedures that avoid false positives) at the same time
as to ensure the translation of the common will of European citizens into legal norms (that is, avoiding false negatives).
There is also the recurring issue of ensuring adequate minority protection.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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tected within the scope of Union law, something which entails that fundamental rights should be the
main constitutional yardstick of European legislation, of the action of EU institutions, and also of nation-
al legislative and executive organs when applying, or claiming exceptions to Union law.
Fourth, the Constitution should reflect the condition of the Union as a community of rights and du-
ties. This also entails the notion of the Union as a community of risks (including economic ones). The
sustenance of the EU entails the allocation of costs and benefits among Member States or regions, as
well as among individuals. The pattern of distribution depends on the good to be allocated or the cost to
be covered. This also entails that the Union’s market-making dimension should be complemented with
a market-correcting one; by social policy and not only by social regulation.
Fifth, the rights-based notion does not depict the Constitution as rooted in a set of pre-political val-
ues. The Constitution could lend symbolic support to any given set of identities, notably a European one,
but it would then also underline the multiple identities of Europeans, for instance as regional, national
and European citizens. The Constitution however, in line with what has been said above, would be such
set up as to render cultural identifications reflexive – and as contingent on compliance with fundamental
individual rights. 
Sixth, this strategy expects the Constitution to provide European citizens with procedural guarantees
which ensure the correct implementation and application of Union law. The concrete breadth and scope
of such guarantees will be directly related to the breadth and scope of rights to political participation.
Thus, the insufficient democratic character of law-making procedures could be partially compensated
for by the granting of individual subject rights to contest the constitutionality of Union laws.
TABLE 1: The legitimation strategies – expectations related to the draft constitution
33. Strong publics refer to institutionalised deliberations whose discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision
making. In institutional terms, strong publics alludes to parliamentary assemblies and discursive bodies in formally
organised institutions imbued with decision-making power, yet constrained by the logic of arguing and impartial
justification. Weak or general publics refer to public spheres “whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion
formation and does not also encompass decision making”. See Nancy Fraser ‘Rethinking the public sphere. A contribution
to the critique of actually existing democracy’, in Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1992), pp.109-42; Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, ‘Democracy through Strong Publics in the European
Union?’, 40 (2002) Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 401-24; and ‘Conceptualising European Public Spheres:
General, Segmented and Strong Publics’, Working Paper ARENA 3/04; and Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Globalising Democracy
without a State: Weak Public, Strong Public, Global Constitutionalism’, 31 (2002) Millenium: Journal of International
Studies, pp. 675-90.
34. National parliaments acting collectively on European issues can supplement and support the EU parliament, when issues
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II. The Substantive Contents of the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty
A) Competences
Federal and quasi-federal polities are characterized by the division of competences not only among dif-
ferent institutions, but also among different levels of government. The international origins of the Euro-
pean Communities go a long way to explain the circumscribed character of the Treaties on this matter.
At the same time as the Communities were assigned specific tasks in the domain of market integration,
the Treaties contemplated flexible arrangements through which Member States could transfer new com-
petences to the Union. It was only after the Treaty of Maastricht that Union primary law tackled the issue,
by means of affirming the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as substantive checks on the as-
signment of powers to the Union.
The Draft Treaty breaks new ground by including a set of general provisions concerning the alloca-
tion of competences between the Union and the Member States. This can be considered in three steps,
those being a) the (re)affirmation of the principle of enumerated competences; b) a three-fold classifica-
tion of competences; and c) the reformulation of the flexibility clause.
a) The principle of enumerated Competences
The Draft reinforces the formulation of the principle of enumerated powers through explicitly stating its
logical corollary that is that if competences have not been conferred, they remain with the Member States
(Art. I-11.2). Even if this does not imply any substantive change in relation to present Community law,
it can be argued that the explicit affirmation of the tenor of this principle contributes to reduce (rightly
or wrongly) the flexibility which has characterised the allocation of powers in European constitutional
law. 
b) A Three-fold characterization of competences
The third Title of the First Part of the Draft Treaty establishes a three-fold classification of the Union’s
competences: 
•e x c l u s i v e ,  
• shared and 
• supporting, coordinating and complementary competences.
However, ad hoc provisions are devoted to the coordination of economic and employment policies
(art. I-12.3 and I-15), to the common foreign and security policy (art. I-12.4 and 16), and even to the
conclusion of international agreements, at least under a certain a contrario interpretation of Art. I-13.2).
These competences do not easily fit into the three-fold classification, to the extent that one can doubt
whether the Draft really classifies competences into three types only. 
In addition, certain specific competence titles established in the Third Part of the Draft seem to put
into question the three-fold distinction. This applies to the competence to facilitate the right of European
citizens to move and reside freely (Art. III-125) a competence which goes beyond the competence title
established in Art. III-136, and which might be said to go beyond Community competence, according to
Article III-133.3.35 To this it must be added that the enumeration of powers under each competence typeJohn Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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does not seem to be fully coherent, either. Thus, the label supporting competence for “industrial policy”
is questionable, given the close relationship that exists with the internal market.36 Similar considerations
can be made regarding the labeling of competences on research as “shared competences”, given the fact
that the Union basically funds research, something which is characteristic of the Treaty’s definition of
supporting, coordinating and complementary competences.
But the most problematic feature of the classification of competences in the Draft Treaty is that Art.
I-12.6 affirms that the Draft respects the division which stems from the present Treaties, as reflected in
part III of the Constitutional Treaty. This entails that the general classification reflects, more than frames,
the present division of powers. Thus, instead of requiring a reinterpretation of the present implicit divi-
sion of competences in their light, the general provisions of the Draft are to be interpreted by reference
to Part III. It is difficult to escape such a conclusion, given the fact that Part III has, at least formally
speaking, the same constitutional status as the other two Parts of the Treaties.37
c) Flexible Transfer of Competences
Article I-18 introduces a new flexibility clause, which grounds Union competence on the need to attain
one of the objectives set out in the Constitution “within the framework of the policies of Part III”38. What
is different from present law is that the Draft introduces additional procedural and substantive hurdles.
On the procedural side, legislation adopted or concrete decisions undertaken under the new flexibility
clause are subject to a decision-making procedure which requires both the unanimous consent of Mem-
ber States and the consent of the European Parliament. On the substantive side, the Draft explicitly for-
mulates that legislation adopted on the basis of I-18 cannot lead to the harmonisation of Member States’
laws or regulations when the Constitution excludes such harmonisation. Both procedural and substantive
limits are intended to render impossible the use of the flexibility provision as an alternative to formal
Treaty amendment.39 
B) Law-making
Law- and decision- making processes are the institutional and procedural arrangements that regulate the
production of common action norms, and the transformation of political initiatives into legal and politi-
cal action. The primary law of the Union is rather complicated on this matter. As a start, Union law has
a confusing system of sources of law, which mainly results from the lack of a nomen iuris which refers
to regulatory instruments, to legal norms which implement general and abstract norms within the frame-
work defined by the former. Moreover, there is a considerable number of different law and decision-
making procedures, both within and outside what is generally referred to as the Community method. Un-
der the general heading of ‘Community method’, the Union has relied on a wide range of different proc-
esses, through which the Community general will is to be ascertained. Such methods have moved from
the ‘classical’ one in which the Commission initiates and the Council decides, to the more complex co-
decision procedure introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht, and whose breadth and scope was increased
both in Amsterdam and Nice. Moreover, the legislative procedures of the second and third pillar are ba-
sically intergovernmental, as no role of European institutions as such is contemplated. However, the
strict distinction between the pillars introduced in Maastricht has progressively eroded, in that issues
35. Cf. F. Mayer, ‘Competences-Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU after the New European Constitution’,
in J.H.H. Weiler and C. Eisgruber, eds, Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet
Working Paper 5/04, New York: New York University, p. 17.
36. Dimitris N. Triantafyllou, Le projet constitutionnel de la Convention européenne, Bruxelles : Bruyllant, 2003,  p. 42
37. Ibid., p. 48.
38. Something which duly reflects the assumption by the Union of competences beyond market-making. As a matter of fact,
this will render discourses on Union policy less centered on “market-making”, but it will not enlarge the scope of the
flexibility clause; indeed, when action was undertaken under Article TEC 308, with Member States agreeing unanimously,
the “common market” connection was also arguable.
39. Given the considerable risk of over-constitutionalisation from the lack of differentiation of Parts I and II versus Parts III in
terms of constitutional status, the opportunity for constitutional tightening of the flexibility clause might be put into
question. But our point here is a more limited one, namely, that this points to a constitutionalisation of the division of
powers.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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have been moved from pillars two and three to one, and some issues must be addressed by several pillars
at the same time. 
All this results in an unclear compromise between two different strategies of democratic legitimacy;
namely (1) derivative executive legitimacy, stemming from the key role assigned to national govern-
ments in the Council; and (2) direct representative legitimacy, resulting from the co-legislative powers
granted to the European Parliament in some procedures. As a result, the existing Union law and decision-
making system holds traits of the first, problem-solving, and the third, rights-based, model. This combi-
nation makes the Union into quite a distinct polity and one that is clearly different from the second, na-
tion-state model cherished by value-based conceptions of the Union. 
The implications of the Draft on law-making procedures will be considered in more detail in five
steps: a) sources of law, b) increased transparency; c) direct democratic legitimacy inputs of general pub-
lics; d) direct democratic legitimacy through new powers granted to the European Parliament; and e) the
emergence of derivative representative legitimacy, by means of the granting of a legislative role to na-
tional parliaments. 
a) Sources of Law
The Draft Treaty introduces a new system of sources of Union law, at the same time that it constitution-
alises the language in which the different sources of Union law are named. 40 
First, the Draft Treaty aims at a systematic regulation of the whole set of legislative acts into cate-
gories which correspond to those entrenched in national constitutional systems (see Article I-33).41
Thus, there is a clear three-fold distinction between statutes (European laws and framework laws), stat-
utory instruments or decrees (regulations) and administrative acts (European decisions). This presuppos-
es a clearer division of labour between the legislature, the executive and the administration, which could
avoid a good deal of the difficulties stemming from the absence of a specific category referring to stat-
utory instruments or decrees in the system of sources of law contemplated in TEC 249.42
Second, the Draft Treaty translates into constitutional language the system of sources of law of Un-
ion law. The Draft Treaty speaks of laws and framework laws, and not of regulations and directives, the
old terminology enshrined in the Treaties.43 This renders the material legal character of Union norms
more obvious, but might at the same time result in obscuring some differences which deserve being
maintained.
b) Transparency of the law-making procedure
Democratic law-making is not just a matter of taking decisions and determining what the common action
norms are, but also of providing the underlying reasons for such norms. This grounds the case for a gen-
40. In doing this, it follows the Conclusions of the Working Group on Simplification, CONV 424/02, available at http://
register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00424en2.pdf.
41. Article I-33.1: “In exercising the competences conferred on it in the Constitution, the Union shall use as legal instruments,
in accordance with the provisions of Part III, European laws, European framework laws, European regulations, European
decisions, recommendations and opinions”; and then I-33.2: “A European law shall be a legislative act of general
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”; I-33.3: “A European framework
law shall be a legislative act binding, as to the result to be achieved, on the Member States to which it is addressed, but
leaving the national authorities entirely free to choose the form and means of achieving that result”; I-33.4: “A European
regulation shall be a non-legislative act of general application for the implementation of legislative acts and of certain
specific provisions of the Constitution. It may either be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States,
or be binding, as regards the result to be achieved, on all Member States to which it is addressed, but leaving the national
authorities entirely free to choose the form and means of achieving that result”; I-33.5: “A European decision shall be a
non-legislative act, binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only
on them”.
42. The original design of the Community legal order presupposed a strict executive federalism, i.e., that regulatory and
implementing measures will be adopted by national administrations. However, it was quickly realised that the effective
realisation of Union policies required the allocation of further normative powers, on what concern statutory instruments
and legislation of detail, to Community institutions. This was crystal clear on what concerned the Common Agricultural
Policy, for example, which could only be turned into reality if Union institutions, and especially the Commission,
undertook a heavy task of regulatory production. This resulted in a blurring of the kind of act which was contained in a
Regulation or a Directive, as the same nomen iuris was applied to both general and regulatory legal norms. Union law was
plagued by the absence of a specific category referring to statutory instruments or decrees in the system of sources of law
(as contemplated in TEC 249), which became extremely problematic with the development of customary, non-Treaty
based implementing norms through the mechanism of delegation of powers.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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eral obligation to obey the law even for those who did not agree with the decision through which the legal
norm in question is enacted. This is why transparency of the deliberations leading to the enactment of a
law is essential in order to ensure the democratic character of law-making processes.
The Draft Treaty affirms the principle of the transparency of Council deliberations with regard to
the examining and adoption of legislative proposals (Article I-50.2). This confirms and reinforces the
decision taken in the European Council of Seville of 2002,44 by which the Council was already expected
to become more transparent. This decision was welcomed by national parliaments, whose supervision of
national executives will be rendered easier. In that regard, it increases the strength of the derivative dem-
ocratic legitimacy of Union law. Moreover, this decision will contribute to foster decision-making tied
to reasons, and also to ease the circulation of arguments between strong and general publics. In that
sense, it might result in increasing the direct democratic legitimacy of Union law.
c) Increased direct democratic legitimacy: general publics
The Draft Treaty contains an explicit acknowledgment of the central role to be played by general publics
in democratic law- and decision-making. Title VI of the first Part of the Draft Treaty is actually entitled
“The Democratic Life of the Union”, while Article I-47 affirms “participatory democracy” as one of the
central principles to guide Union law- and decision-making. 
However, this is not accompanied by a thorough reconsideration of the political rights acknowl-
edged to European citizens. One novelty is the right to exert legislative initiative through the collection
of signatures. As we will see, however, this formally results in a mere invitation to the Commission to
present a legislative initiative, and not in an autonomous power of any kind., Moreover, some of the re-
maining provisions whose literal tenor is new merely consolidate the practice of consultation of stake-
holders which is usually considered as part of the Union governance structures. Thus, articles I-47 and
I-50 require the Commission to consult ‘civil society’ when launching legislative initiatives, but it can
be doubted whether this really corresponds to the fostering of the input of general publics.
d) Increased direct democratic legitimacy: strong publics
The Draft Treaty confirms the double-sided character of the democratic legitimacy of Union law. At the
same time that it aims at increasing derivative democratic legitimacy by means of assigning a direct role
to national parliaments, it expands the breadth and scope of the powers assigned to the European Parlia-
ment. This results in strengthening the representative democratic legitimacy pillar of Union law, both
through European and national representative institutions.45 
43. The legal system of the Communities was originally characterised by the delegation of autonomous law-making power to
Community institutions, an exercise that resulted in two main types of general legal norms, i.e. regulations and directives.
Both regulations and directives were regarded as directly and immediately effective in national legal orders, once approved
through the relevant Community law-making process. In that regard, they were materially equivalent to national statutes
(‘lois, leggi, leyes’). However, the democratic legitimacy of Union law was purely derivative, as regulations and directives
were approved through a procedure where citizens exerted only a very indirect influence. Neither European nor national
parliaments were given much of a say, as the final legislative word was entrusted to the Council of Ministers, where
national executives were represented. True, directives were to be implemented by national law-making procedures, but
within the (increasingly detailed) framework of the directive, whose legal effectiveness was further enhanced by the
affirmation, under given conditions, of their direct effect by the European Court of Justice. To the extent that national
governments were elected by democratic parliaments, and each national representative was granted a veto power, Union
law enjoyed derivative democratic legitimacy, of a similar kind to that acknowledged in classical international law. 
This necessarily resulted in an unclear hierarchical relationship between national statutes and their European material
equivalent, i.e., regulations and directives. The primacy of Community over national law, affirmed by the European Court
of Justice, and accepted by many national courts, has been accepted as a matter of practice, but remains on shaky grounds.
It is indeed problematic that national norms, especially constitutional norms, with a high procedural democratic legitimacy,
are to be left aside when in conflict with European norms of dubious democratic legitimacy.
The move from individual to collective veto powers with the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council has
come hand in hand with the infusion of some degree of procedural democratic legitimacy to Union law-making process.
Thus, there is a direct correlation between the move towards QMV in the Council and the assignment of veto power to the
European Parliament. This results in a different, more complex and nuanced, combination of derivative and direct
democratic legitimacy.
44. See President Conclusions of the Seville European Council, June 2002, Annex 2, points 10-11, ‘Opening Council meetings
to the public when the Council is acting in accordance with the procedure for co-decision with the European Parliament’,
available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/pdf/sev2_en.pdf.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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The Draft Treaty turns co-decision into the standard Union law-making procedure (cf. Articles I-34
III-396).46 What was introduced as an exception to the rule in the Treaty of Maastricht is now formally
the rule. 
Having said that, a systematic reading of the Draft allows us to distinguish a number of exceptions
to this rule, which correspond to three alternative law-making procedures, characterised as follows:
i) The European Parliament has no say on the legislative procedure, and it is merely to be consulted.
The power to enact new laws is assigned to the Council, which is to decide unanimously. This is the
case of legislation on: 
• citizenship rights (art. III-126: right to vote and stand as candidate in elections to the European
Parliament and in municipal elections; art. III-125.2: measures concerning passports, identity
cards, residence permits or any other such document, measures concerning security or social
protection; measures to secure diplomatic and consular protection of citizens of the Union in
third countries: III-127.1);47 
• some key norms defining the single market, such as a) the regime of the free movement of per-
sons (III-172.2), b) rights and interests of employed persons (III-172.2), c) social security and
protection of workers, protection of workers when their employment contract is terminated, rep-
resentation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-de-
termination, conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union
territory (III-210.3 c, d, f and g, and III-210.1);48 
• norms concerning the harmonization of tax measures (III-171);49 and constraints to the free
movement of capital to third countries (III-157.3)
• linguistic regime of uniform intellectual property rights protection and centralized Union-wide
authorization (III-176)
• family law norms with cross-border implications (Article III-269.3)50
• environmental policy; Article III-234.2 leaves in the hands of the Council (1) measures of a pri-
marily fiscal nature; (2) measures affecting town and country planning, quantitative manage-
ment of water resources, or affecting, directly or indirectly, the availability of such resources,
cland use; (3) measures significantly affecting the choice of each Member State between differ-
ent energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply;51 
• police cooperation; the Council needs only consulting Parliament on (a) Operational coopera-
tion between police authorities (Article III-275.3), (2) the operation of police forces in the terri-
tory of another MS in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of that State (Article III-277).
45. It is usually assumed that successive Treaty amendments have resulted in a progressive democratisation of the Union law-
making procedures. This perception is based on the slowly but steadily strengthening of the European Parliament. From
being a merely advisory institution, almost on a par with the Social and Economic Committee in the founding Treaties, the
Parliament have become a central institution in the law-making process, equipped with the right to veto any piece of
legislation which has to be approved through the co-decision procedure, now used to approve a majority of secondary
Community norms. The first step was taken in the 1970 and 1975 Treaty amendments, which granted the Parliament
limited but far from negligible powers in the budgetary process. The Single European Act turned the Parliament into a
decisive institution in the law-making process, by introducing the co-operation legislative procedure. The Maastricht
Treaty increased the salience of the Parliament’s role by granting it veto power in the new co-decision procedure that has
been further strengthened by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.
46. It must also be stated that the Draft Treaty requires the consent of the European Parliament before an international treaty is
ratified by the Union in terms rather similar to the national constitutions requiring the consent of national parliaments
(Article III-227.7; it is especially noticeable the reference to “agreements covering fields to which the legislative procedure
applies”, which translates the terms used in present Article TEC 300 into proper constitutional language).
47. Moreover, Article III-13 subjects the extension of the rights of European citizenship to (1) unanimous consent among
Council members; (2) approval by the European Parliament; (3) ratification by each Member State in accordance with
national constitutional provisions. This amounts to specifying a rather ad hoc procedure of constitutional reform.
48. The Article subjects Community legislation to the further requirement of respecting the basic principles of national
security systems and financial equilibrium. However, the Council can decide by unanimity to subject the approval of some
of these norms to the ordinary legislative procedure (III-104.3).
49. Although the Council could unanimously decide to subject some family law norms with cross-border implications to the
ordinary legislative procedure (III-269.3).John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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ii) The European Parliament has no say on the legislative procedure, and it is not even required that it
be consulted:
This is the case of legal norms dealing with:
• common foreign and security policy (Article III-300)
• common security and defence policy (Article III-309.2). 
• common commercial policy negotiations, as Article III-315.3 keeps on limiting the power to es-
tablish a mandate to the Council, as well as the ratification of agreements) 
• the domains where the Union operates through the so-called open method of coordination, that
is, social policy, employment, but also economic policy coordination through the Broad Eco-
nomic Policy Guidelines. 
• monetary policy, where powers are monopolized by the European System of Central Banks,
with the European Central Bank at its head.
iii) The budgetary procedure, which is subject to a specific procedure of great complexity, in which the
allocation of powers extends to national parliaments. There  are  three  main  budgetary  legislative
acts: 
• The Decision on own resources, now named as Own Resources Law, which is required to enu-
merate the sources of Union revenue and to cap the total amount at its disposal (in actual prac-
tice, this is done by reference to a percentage of the total wealth of the Union) (art. I-54). This
amounts to the full constitutionalisation of the own resources decision, the approval of which
follows at present a procedure which is formally considered an amendment of the Treaties, even
if in an abridged and simplified form. In the Draft Constitution, the Own Resources Law would
be approved if there is unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers, and if the Law is rat-
ified by all Member States in accordance with their national constitutional provisions. This
clearly compromises the characterization of the Union’s resources as its own resources, and
leads, with all probability, to the granting of a veto right to each and every national parliament
(a tall decision in a European Union with a membership of twenty five plus);
• The Financial Perspectives, which originated customarily out of the mismatch between the spirit
of the Treaty reforms of 1970 and 1975 which granted budgetary powers to the European Par-
liament and the literal tenor of the said Treaties which limited the effective power of the Euro-
pean Parliament on the matter. Such practical arrangements are now fully given constitutional
resilience, and redefined as “Multiannual Financial Frameworks”. They ares expected to “deter-
mine the amounts of the annual ceilings for commitment appropriations by category of expend-
iture” (Art. I-55.1 and III-402), thus framing to a considerable extent the shape of the decisions
contained in the annual budget. The Constitution renders clear that the first financial framework
law should be approved by the Council acting unanimously, jointly with the European Parlia-
ment acting by a majority of its component members. Successive financial framework laws
would have to be jointly approved by the Council and the Parliament, but the Council could act
by qualified majority; 
• Finally, the annual budget (I-56) determines the revenue and expenditure of the Union for the
fiscal year.52 
50. Cf. also Article III-157.3, concerning the enactment of measures which constitute a step back in Union law as regards
liberalization of the movement of capital to or from third countries. The Draft put forward by the Convention included two
rather modest inroads into the principle of unanimous decision-making on tax issues. Article III-62.2 opened the way to
qualified majority voting on tax measures related to administrative cooperation or combating tax fraud and tax evasion,
while Article III-63 did the same for “measures on company taxation relating to administrative cooperation or combating
tax fraud and tax evasion”. In both cases, it was necessary that the Council agreed unanimously that such measures were
necessary for the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition beforehand. Both norms have been deleted in the
IGC Draft, apparently under heavy pressure from some national delegations (which would probably include the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Latvia). But one wonders whether such norms were not a rather modest specification of Article 96
TEC, basically reproduced in Article III-66 of the Draft Constitution in its Convention version, and III-174 in its IGC
version.
51. It is also possible in this subject matter to move to the ordinary law-making procedure.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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e) Derivative legitimacy in representative terms
The Draft Treaty also confers a specific role to national parliaments in a majority of Union law-making
processes. In doing so, the Draft contributes to the derivative democratic legitimacy of Union law, but
in an innovative way. Arguably, the provisions of the Draft on this matter ensure that Union law obtains
further democratic legitimacy stemming from the custodian role assigned to national parliaments. Only
indirectly could this be said to result in the increase of the powers assigned to Member States.
Until now, national parliaments could play only an indirect role in European legislative processes;
more precisely, they could exert the powers acknowledged by their national constitution to control their
national executives, also on what concerned their participation in Council meetings. In most cases, par-
liaments exert a controlling role over the national executive when acting as national representative in the
European Council. Indeed, and following the German example, all national parliaments have ended up
establishing committees specialized on following European decision- and law-making processes. This
limits, even if not fully avoids, the risks of executive empowerment.53 
The Draft Treaty goes beyond that. More specifically, the Protocols ‘on the Role of National Parlia-
ments in the European Union’ (hereafter Parliaments’ Protocol) and ‘on the application of the Principles
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ (hereafter, Subsidiarity Protocol) give national parliaments the pow-
er 
• to let their voice be heard individually on the question whether each and every of the European leg-
islative proposals complies with the principle of subsidiarity; moreover, all the institutions which
participate in the process of European law-making “shall take account of the reasoned opinions” of
national parliaments (Subsidiarity Protocol, point 5) 
• to request the review of the legislative proposal to the Commission, such a power being granted col-
lectively (at least of one third of national parliamentary chambers must join forces to exert this pow-
er54); such a review might lead to maintaining, amending or withdrawing the proposal; the
Commission can decide what to do, but should always “give reasons” grounding its decision; 
• to challenge before the European Court of Justice European legislative acts on account of the in-
fringement of the principle of subsidiarity; however, the literal tenor of the Subsidiarity Protocol
leaves it to the constitutional order of each Member State to determine the specific terms according
to which national governments should act on behalf of national Parliaments (“notified by [national
governments] in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or chamber
of it”). 
The direct powers granted to national parliaments are, however, limited in scope. It is also important
to notice that they result in the establishment of direct, constitutionally mandated, relationships between
Union institutions, i.e. the Commission and the European Parliament, and national parliaments. Indeed,
the Parliaments’ protocol imposes upon the Commission the obligation to transmit directly the annual
legislative program, all Commission consultation documents, all legislative proposals, and any other
documents which it transmits to the European Parliament and the European Council to national parlia-
ments (see points 1 and 2 of the Parliaments’ Protocol).
52. Given the extremely limited amount of resources in the hands of the Union at present (the current Own Resources Decision
caps Union revenue at 1.27 per cent of the Gross National Income of the Union), and given the sheer number of national
parliaments that would have to accept the increase of such a ceiling, any policy measure which will require an increase in
Union revenue (it does not take much ingenuity to realize that redistributive measures at the European scale will fall under
such a heading) will be dramatically constrained by the number of actors with veto power. This entails that the powers of
the European Parliament over European budgetary norms are probably weakened, not strengthened by the Draft
Constitution.
53. The strengthening of such a supervisory role of national parliaments would clearly contribute to avoid the undermining of
democracy at the national, but also at the European level.
54. Both protocols define the “third” by reference to a vote system. In such a system, each chamber of a bicameral
Parliamentary system has a vote (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have one vote each) while single-chambered
Parliaments in unicameral Parliamentary systems have two votes (the Finnish Parliament, thus, has two votes). This
assigns the same number of votes to each Member State, but might lead to rather peculiar results.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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C) Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights constitute one of the essential components of democratic constitutions. They do not
only express the basic preconditions of a well-functioning democratic government, but also establish
mandates to legislatures to respect the basic ethical choices taken by the political community at its con-
stitutive stage. They are closely related to the basic substantive principles affirmed by the constitution
as defining of the identity of the political community.
Once again, the international origins of the European Communities go a long way to explain the suc-
cinctness of the original Treaties on this matter. While there was an explicit reference to the economic
freedoms which underpinned the common market objectives, the Treaties did not contain a catalogue of
fundamental rights, but two meager articles which enshrined the principles of non-discrimination on the
basis of nationality, and a circumscribed principle of non-discrimination on a sexual basis. This did not
prevent the Court from proclaiming that the principle of protection of fundamental rights was one of the
basic principles of Community law, even if unwritten. This opened the way for a jurisprudential elabo-
ration of a catalogue of fundamental rights. This was finally consolidated by a representative Convention
which produced the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter was solemnly
proclaimed by the Union institutions in December 2000, but was not formally incorporated into primary
Union law. This has not prevented the Commission and the Parliament from considering themselves
bound by the Charter, or the invocation of the charter by the Court of First Instance, the Advocates Gen-
eral of the Court of Justice, several national constitutional courts and, last but obviously not least, the
European Court of Human Rights.
The first part of the Draft further elaborates on the values (Art. I-2)55 and objectives (Art. I-3) of the
European Union,56 paramount among which are the fundamental rights enshrined in Part II of the Con-
stitution.
This second part of the Draft Treaty formally incorporates into the constitution of Union law the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It basically reproduces the text approved by the
Charter Convention, solemnly proclaimed in December 2000 immediately before the Nice European
Council.57
The Charter of Rights reflects the basic principle of the indivisibility of fundamental rights. Its Pre-
amble, also reproduced in the Constitution, renders clear that dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity are
co-original founding principles of Union law. This is reflected in the protection afforded not only to civic
and political, but also to social and economic rights (rights to solidarity in the Charter parlance). The ex-
tent to which this results in mandates to the legislature, depends on the construction of the Charter pro-
visions, and, very specifically, on the systematic interpretation of the Charter together with the economic
55. The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail.
56. 1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal
market where competition is free and undistorted.
3. The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between
women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded
and enhanced.
4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to
peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair
trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular children’s rights, as well as to the strict
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter.
5. The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred
upon it in the Constitution.
57. As is well-known, the Charter was not formally incorporated into the Treaties, but did have legal bite, as it is a
consolidation of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and as such, part and parcel of Union law.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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freedoms, now assigned constitutional status (Art. I-4.1), the general clause on the protection of funda-
mental rights (Art I-9), and the new horizontal provisions of the Charter (especially Art II-111).
D) The conception of cultural community
A critical issue that divides constitutional scholars is whether a constitution should rest upon a distinctive
cultural value basis, which presupposes a common sense of identity, or whether the constitution can be
steeped in trans-cultural norms and universal principles that can be agreed-upon across cultures. Both
law and culture are communal building-blocks. The constitution as the fount for the constitutive norms
of any given community evokes those values and principles that are designative of that particular com-
munity. 
The Draft evokes the values and principles that are designative of the Union as a particular political
community. On the one hand, the Draft refers to a set of universal principles on which the Union is
founded. Article I-2 sets out the values that the Union is founded on, namely human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality58, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Article I-2 further notes that “[t]hese
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Central to the Union’s objectives is to
‘promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (I-3). The list is very similar to the one al-
ready established in Amsterdam, and since then inscribed in the TEC; however, it is slightly dissimilar
from the one contained in the Preamble to the Charter, also contained in the Draft. This universalistic
impetus fits very well with the definition of terms according to which the Union should relate to the
world at large: “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and
interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of in-
ternational law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”(Article I-3.4)
On the other hand, the Union affirms certain principles which identify it vis-à-vis other non-Euro-
pean polities. In Article I-1.3 we find reference to the social market economy, a peculiar term which
evokes the image of the welfare state – perhaps the most genuine European acquis in the view of Eu-
rope’s citizens. Having said that, the Draft’s usage of the term ‘social market economy’ is problematic,
as it is used in combination with “competitiveness” and “price stability”, both of which as we have noted
are bolstered and – privileged – by numerous specific provisions in the draft. 
Moreover, the Union defines the parameters within which European identity is to be forged, while
also respecting the peculiar features of national identities. The Union, through the pursuit of its objec-
tives, is instructed to foster unity and community and a sense of European attachment through common
European symbols, such as a European flag, a European anthem, a common currency and a Europe-day
(I-8). But it is also instructed to “respect [Europe’s] rich cultural and linguistic diversity”, and further in
a more active sense it “shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”(I-3.3)
Presumably this also includes national identities, as Article I-5 states that: “The Union shall respect …
the national identities of its Member States…”.
This particular mixture of universalistic and ethical values is reflected in the definition of the condi-
tions of accession to the Union. “The Union shall be open to all European states which respect its values
and are committed to promoting them together” (Article I-1).
58. Equality was added in the final draft, after great pressure by numerous members of the Convention.24
III. Assessment
A) Competences
The Draft Treaty introduces a degree of formalisation of the division of competences which, while not
meeting all the requirements of the rights-based conception, clearly goes beyond what could be expected
from the problem-solving conception of the Union. 
As already noticed, much of the actual bite of the new provisions contained in Part I of the Consti-
tution will depend on how the different parts of the Constitution will relate to each other, and more spe-
cifically, whether this will entail a hierarchical ranking between Parts I, II and perhaps IV (deemed
constitutional parts proper), and Part III (detailed provisions on policies and the functioning of the Un-
ion). But even if Part III is granted equal constitutional status, which entails that the framing value of the
general competence provisions is relativised, it is quite clear that the new constitutional ordering will
curtail the Member States’ ability to serve as Masters of the Treaties, and consequently, to direct the
process of integration. This becomes clear when contrasting the present Article TEC 308 with Article I-
18 of the Draft. Competences can be Europeanised or renationalised within the framework established
by the Draft, but only in accordance with specific procedures, and subject to the material limits stemming
from a systematic interpretation of the provisions of the Draft.59
In itself, this indicates a clear move away from the problem-solving conception. The general trend
is for the principles of allocation of competences in Union law to increasingly come to correspond with
those required by a rights-based conception of the Union’s constitution. First, the Draft entrenches the
principle of enumerated powers by means of explicitly stating that if competences have not been con-
ferred on the Union, they remain with the Member States (Art. I-11). This introduces a first element of
formalisation of the division of powers among different levels of government, and provides a first ele-
ment to determine the condition (European, national or regional citizenship) through which citizens will
take decisions. This constrains the flexibility of the arrangements cherished by the problem-solving con-
ception, at the same time as it precludes the Union from developing into a nation-state, as the value-based
conception requires. This indeed would have necessitated the existence of a residual powers clause. Such
a clause would have affirmed the opposite principle, namely that the Union will be assigned all compe-
tences not expressly left in the hands of Member States. Second, the Draft reinforces the judicial moni-
toring of the division of powers between levels of government. Indeed, one of the main implications of
the assignment of a direct role to national parliaments in the Union law-making procedure is to increase
the number of potential cases in which the Court will be required to check compliance with the principle
59. As is well-known, Article TEC 308 establishes a last-resort competence basis for Community acts based on the need to
attain one of the objectives of the Community “in the course of the operation of the common market”. Legislation is then
subject to unanimous consent in the Council, with the Parliament being consulted. Article I-18 introduces a new flexibility
clause, which grounds Union competence on the necessity to attain one of the objectives set in the Constitution “within the
framework of the policies of Part III”. What is different from present law is that the Draft introduces additional procedural
and substantive hurdles. On the procedural hand, legislation adopted or concrete decisions undertaken under the new
flexibility clause are subject to a decision-making procedure which requires both the unanimous consent of Member States
and the consent of the European Parliament. On the substantive hand, the Draft explicitly formulates that legislation
adopted on the basis of I-18 cannot lead to the harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations when the Constitution
excludes such harmonisation. Both procedural and substantive limits render it almost unfeasible to make use of the
flexibility provision as an alternative to Treaty amendment. Given the considerable risk of overconstitutionalisation
stemming from the lack of differentiation of Parts I and II and Parts III in terms of constitutional status, the opportunity of
the constitutional tightening of the flexibility clause might be put into question. But our point here is a more limited one,
namely, that this points to a constitutionalisation of the division of powers.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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of subsidiarity. As was indicated in Part II, national parliaments are granted a right both to object to the
proposal on subsidiarity and proportionality grounds within a six-week time limit, and, if the proposal is
turned into law without changes which render it compliant with proportionality, to request their national
governments to contest the Euro-constitutionality of the law before the European Court of Justice. While
the judicialisation of conflicts on competences is something which might be explained by problem-solv-
ing conceptions as required on credibility grounds, it openly contradicts a value-based conception of the
Constitution of the Union.
B) Law-Making Procedures
Here we also find some elements which speak to the problem-solving conception, while there are others
that imply that this model has been transcended, and further that the Draft moves the Union in a rights-
based direction.
The four main elements of the design of law-making procedures in the Draft Treaty which speak to
the problem-solving conception of the Union are: (1) the numerous exceptions to the co-decision proce-
dure, which ensure that Member States keep on playing the sole decisive role in a large number of areas;
(2) the retention of purely intergovernmental procedures in much of what used to be pillars two and
three; (3) the development of institutional structures associated with the Union’s intergovernmental di-
mension, which is more likely after the changes to the Presidency of the European Council
First, there are many weighty exemptions to the co- decision procedure, so many as to qualify the
very notion of co-decision as the standard law-making procedure (as this was set out in article I-34). This
entails that there is a hard core of subjects in which Member States retain sole legislative power, which
harmonizes with the problem-solving conception of the Union. 
Second, the Draft retains, and perhaps even strengthens, aspects of the Council-led (former pillars
two and three) decision-making method. Such a potential strengthening would derive from the increased
use of QMV in the Council, which is indeed elevated to the status of general voting principle (Article I-
25), while keeping Union institutions at bay in what remains of the pillar procedures. 
Third, the greatly extended tenure of the elected president of the European Council (from the present
system of half a year to a possible total of 5 years) could also strengthen the Council. If this also means
that the Council develops a greatly strengthened institutional support structure,60 the net effect could be
a weakening of the Community method, which would indirectly result in weakening the direct democrat-
ic legitimacy basis of Union law. This would take the Union closer to the first model set out above. The
problem here is that increased use of qualified majority in the Council would exacerbate the problem of
retaining national democracy. Some of this would be alleviated by another set of provisions in the Draft,
namely the much stricter and more encompassing transparency requirements (Article I-50, III-399),
which include provisions for the Council to conduct its deliberations in public when serving in a legis-
lative capacity.
A further point which might sustain traits of the problem-solving model refers to the Draft’s reten-
tion of the existing system of Commission initiative.61 Such a notion is however premised on the assump-
tion that the Commission would serve as an expert body, and would merely deal with pragmatic issues.
Given the Union’s consistently increased realm of action, such an assumption is increasingly unrealistic.
It also contravenes the increasingly democratic terms of Commission – EP interaction.62 Nevertheless,
Commission monopoly on initiative is problematic from a democratic standpoint (ref. models two and
three), as it deprives the European strong public par excellence, the European Parliament, of such a right.
True, this is somehow alleviated by the fact that the Commission is responsible to the European Parlia-
ment (Article I-26.8, with reference to Article III-340). But the Commission is merely approved, not des-
ignated, by the European Parliament, contrary to what could be expected in a fully-fledged parliamentary
system.63 Since the Commission does not emanate from the Parliament and is not popularly elected, the
60. This was frequently referred to as a concern among Convention members. See Convention plenary debates.
61. The Parliament can request the Commission to submit a proposal on any topic (III-332) but the Commission decides as to
whether it wants to do so. It is only obligated to inform the Parliament of its decision.
62. As the recent Buttiglione imbroglio further testifies to.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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institutional mechanism that produces a legislative initiative is not explicitly rooted in the European cit-
izenry. In other words, one core component required to ensure the notion of citizens as self-legislating
is inadequately developed. This conclusion is not greatly weakened by the right to popular initiative (Ar-
ticle I-47.4). As already noticed, what this kind of popular initiative boils down to is an invitation to the
Commission to submit a legislative proposal. The Commission remains free to do whatever it finds suit-
able with such an initiative.64 
The important point to note here is that the relevant standard for assessing inter-institutional rela-
tions has become the third model, even if it is far from perfectly reflected in the positive provisions of
the Draft.65 
This is also consistent with the general thrust of the Draft, which can be said to push the Union fur-
ther in the direction of the third model. This can be argued on the basis of four decisions contained in the
Draft Treaty, namely (1) the affirmation of the principle of transparency of institutional law-making,
which is extended to the Council of Ministers; (2) the affirmation of co-decision as the standard legisla-
tive procedure; (3) improved national executive control; and (4) increased derivative democratic legiti-
macy through the assignment of a legislative role to national parliaments. 
First, transparency: this weakens Member States control of the integration process, and opens up for
its politicization. Given that this is likely to bring in non-pragmatic issues or redefine issues (bio-tech-
nology not only as an efficient means of producing food but also as a profoundly important ethical issue),
the problem-solving system will fall short.
Second, despite the exceptions listed above, it is noteworthy that the Draft presents co-decision as
the standard law-making procedure in Union law (cf. Articles I-34, III-396), for two reasons. First, this
provision places the notion of Union direct democratic legitimacy at the forefront and as a critical stand-
ard. Second, the provision will likely increase the number of legal acts approved by co-decision and will
further empower the European Parliament. These provisions in the Draft thus move the Union closer to
the third model, although it is also clear that they fall short of the criteria in the third model. 
Third, when considered in relation to the three models, (and when viewed in isolation from the issue
of the division of powers), improved executive accountability at the national level would increase the
Union’s legitimacy in relation to all the three models listed above. But the models differ in terms of to
whom such accountability foremost applies. The first model highlights the parliamentary dimension,
whereas the two latter models see parliaments (as strong publics) and the general public as equally im-
portant. 
Fourth, the Draft contains transparency provisions that will heighten accountability to parliaments
and to general publics. The public nature of the Council’s legislative meetings will clearly enhance ef-
fective control on the part of national parliaments, as national governments will not be able to hide be-
neath vague appeals to consensus  in order to depart from the mandate established by national
parliaments. The protocol on National Parliaments compels the Commission to transmit to each national
parliament the annual legislative program, all Commission consultation documents, all legislative pro-
posals, and any other documents which it transmits to the European Parliament and the European Coun-
cil (see points 1 and 2 of the Parliaments’ Protocol). Presumably, then, each parliament would decide
whether to make these public. 
Fifth, among the most publicized innovations of the Draft is the conferral of certain powers to na-
tional parliaments within the European law-making process. At present, the role of national parliaments
in the European law-making process is wholly determined by national constitutional provisions. In most
cases, parliaments exert a controlling role over the national executive when acting as national represent-
ative in the European Council, albeit one that has generally not been seen as adequate to avoid executive
63. The European Council proposes a candidate for President of the Commission to the Parliament, who is adopted or rejected
by the EP. Again consider the recent imbroglio between the Parliament and the newly appointed Commission President
Barroso.
64. Thus, this measure falls short of serving as an institutional vehicle to foster self-legislating citizens.
65. A pluralistic definition of the common will is part and parcel of the federal character of a rights-based Union. However,
this requires a constitutional framework which articulates in a normative satisfactory manner the different procedures
through which the common will is expressed. By means of making a step towards a more complete system of sources of
law, the Draft Treaty pushes the European Union forward in this concrete regard, although still not sufficiently.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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dominance. The strengthening of such a supervisory role of national parliaments will help stall the un-
dermining of democracy at the national, but presumably also at the European level. 
Note that a strengthened role of national parliaments within the Union's law-making process is not
necessarily compatible with the third model. Such strengthening is actually foremost a case of the first
model: to alleviate the democratic deficit through executive dominance that this model almost inevitably
produces. With regard to the third model, including national parliaments in the Union law-making proc-
ess leads to confusion in the notion of citizens as self-legislators: why should European citizens defer to
national citizens in such matters? Much of this boils down to the division of powers and competences:
when there is a system of clearly delineated competences at each level, there is no real need for national
parliamentary involvement in Union law-making. But when such lines are hazy and greatly overlap, such
as is still the case with the Union, it might be necessary to supplement Union law-making with national
inputs. But for such a supplementing at all to be compatible with the third model, it presupposes a way
of harmonizing national positions, which has not taken place.66 
C) Fundamental Rights
The formal inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is, indeed, one of the potentially most tran-
scendental decisions in the Draft. It is also the one that most explicitly moves the Union in symbolic and
substantive terms beyond the problem-solving conception of the Union and its attendant constitutional
architecture. 
By making the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU an explicit part of the primary law of the
Union,67 the Draft greatly raises the symbolic role and visibility of fundamental rights. As we saw in Part
II, Community law has long been said to be founded on the principle of protection of fundamental rights,
but the Charter signals that they are an intrinsic and outstanding part of the EU constitutional edifice.
Indeed, a resolve on the part of the EU to make a Charter could be seen as an important stepping stone
towards a rights-based democratic constitution for Europe. The very notion of a Charter of Rights can
be said to be laden with constitutional symbolism. But that of course presupposes that the Charter con-
tains the requisite range of rights and also that these operate – and are made to operate – in accordance
with the requirements of the third rights-based model.
The Charter is not different from, neither more constrained in its scope than, conventional state-
based Charters or Bills of Rights. If it has an outstanding characteristic it is that of enshrining rights of
the so-called fourth generation, which deal with social problems which only the most recent constitutions
have had the chance to deal with, such as bioethics. Further, the strong onus on solidarity and social
rights in the Charter could – if pursued to the full – provide the EU with a more explicit ethical founda-
tion. The reformulation of the substantive values at the foundation of Union law does not lead in itself,
quite obviously, to the establishment of different economic and social policies, neither at the European
nor at the national level. But it can in fairness be said to open up political space. The Charter opens up
the way to an increased abstract weighting of fundamental rights68 in cases of conflict with the basic eco-
nomic freedoms enshrined in the Treaties (the so-called four economic freedoms, and the principle of
free competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 TEC). This is based on the fact that the Charter grants
fundamental status to what are usually labelled as civic, political and social rights, while denying such
status to the four basic economic freedoms, which are to be seen as concretizations of wider and more
abstract rights, such as the right to private property. This has the consequence of shifting the scope of
what can be said to be constitutionally mandated by Union law. Since the late seventies,69 the European
66. The almost unanimous embrace of the principle that the relation between national executives and parliaments should be
fully determined by national constitutional provisions confuses formal and effective democratic sovereignty. The effective
democratic sovereignty of national parliaments, one could claim, depends on the existence of common norms established
at the European level. Such norms can be seen as formally impinging upon national sovereignty, but in substantive terms
they render it possible to establish the preconditions for the exercise of national democratic sovereignty. The Draft in this
respect falls short of the requirements in models two and three. 
67. See I-7: “Fundamental Rights”, which states that “The Union shall recognize the rights, freedoms and principles set out in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the Constitution” (CONV 850/03: 8).
68. Robert Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’, 16 (2003) Ratio Juris, pp. 433—49, especially
p. 440.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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Court of Justice has tended to argue that, next to the explicit exceptions enumerated in the Treaties, the
canon of exceptions to economic freedoms should be determined through a systematic interpretation of
Community law as a whole.70 The Charter seems to reinforce such an approach, by means of providing
simultaneously normative guidance and certainty (as fundamental rights provisions could be read as a
numerus clausus of exceptions).71 This approach can already be seen at work in the opinions of Advo-
cates General and in the judgments of the Court published after the solemn proclamation of the Charter.
This is clearly the case with the judgment and the Opinion in Schmidberger72, and might lead to a similar
result in Omega73 and Grøngaard.74 Moreover, the different abstract weighting of fundamental rights
versus economic freedoms propitiated by the Charter might lead to a different structuring of the weigh-
ing and balancing of them in case of conflict, and more specifically, to the shifting of the burden of ar-
gumentation in favour of fundamental rights, and against economic freedom. Advocate General
Geehoeld seems to be pointing in this direction in her Opinion in American Tobacco.75 76
Having said that, there are aspects of its drafting and its perceived role in the EU that affect the sa-
lience of the Fundamental Rights provisions of the Treaty to serve as vehicles for the rights-based con-
ception of the Union. First, the Charter does not abrogate the aspect of differentiated citizenship that
inheres from the fact that access to EU citizenship is conditioned on national citizenship and subject to
national rules of incorporation, but it might narrow it considerably. Second, provisions on citizens’ pub-
lic autonomy77 in the Charter are rather weak, and in themselves do not allow to claim that the citizen
has been placed at the core of the process of European integration. This is further confirmed by provi-
sions on citizens’ rights contained in the first part, as already noticed when considering Union law-mak-
ing processes. Third, rights to solidarity are granted a weaker status and protection than civic rights, and
very especially, the right to private property. This has the implication that the former should be consid-
ered as setting exceptions to the breadth and scope of economic freedoms, and as such, be more ‘valua-
ble’ in the protection of fundamental collective goods, over that of serving as fundamental subjective
rights. In other words, there is a risk of civic rights becoming instrumentalised. Fourth, the horizontal
clauses (and to some extent the onus on interpreting it in line with the explanations provided by the Char-
ter Convention) clearly restrict its scope of application. This is especially so after the actual drafting
changes introduced in the Charter as solemnly proclaimed in 2000 by the Laeken Convention, and later
endorsed by the IGC.
Moreover, some of the potentialities of the Charter are limited by some of the general provisions in
the first part of the Draft. It could be argued that certain provisions curtail the opening of political space
envisioned by the very presence of the Charter. Indeed, the Draft grants constitutional status to values
that undermine the actual legal force of socio-economic fundamental rights and principles. Two main
observations are due in this respect: (a) While the Preamble of the Charter78 enshrined dignity, freedom,
equality and solidarity as the grounding principles of Union law, Article 2 of the Draft Constitution of-
fers a longer, more prolix and at the same time narrower definition of such principles (“respect of human
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect of human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities”). We already noticed this discrepancy in Part II. It is now proper to
69. More specifically, since the judgment in Cassis de Dijon, Judgment in Case 120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
für Branntwein, 1979 [ECR] 649.
70. K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1999, pp. 135ff.
They label as the rule of reason the set of exceptions which the Court has referred as “reasonable” national measures in
restraint of economic freedoms.
71. A.J. Menéndez, ‘Three conceptions of the European constitution’, in Eriksen et al., supra, fn 9. 
72. See Case C-112/00, Opinion of the AG Jacobs delivered on 11 July, 2002, judgment of the court was delivered on 12 June
2003. See 2003 [ECR] I-5659, par. 89: “This appears to be the first case in which a Member State has invoked the necessity
to protect fundamental rights to justify a restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty. Such cases have
perhaps been rare because restrictions of the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty are normally imposed not to protect the
fundamental rights of individuals but on the ground of broader general interest objectives such as public health or
consumer protection. It is however conceivable that such cases may become more frequent in the future: many of the
grounds of justification currently recognised by the Court could also be formulated as being based on fundamental rights
considerations”; and par. 95: “In such a case the Court in my view should follow the same two-step approach as the
analysis of the traditional grounds of justification such as public policy or public security which are also based on the
specific situation in the Member State concerned. It must therefore be established (a) whether in relying on the particular
fundamental rights recognised in Austrian law in issue, Austria is, as a matter of Community law, pursuing a legitimate
objective in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on a fundamental Treaty freedom; and (b) if so, whether
the restriction in issue is proportionate to the objective pursued”.The Draft Constitutional Treaty: Between Problem-Solving Treaty and Rights-Based Constitution
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highlight that in Article I-2 solidarity is relegated to the condition of a second-rank principle, together
with pluralism, tolerance, justice, and equality between men and women79; (b) Article I-3 tilts the bal-
ance in favour of economic freedoms when determining the objectives to be aimed at by the Union. Such
a market bias was already present in the Convention draft, although not so much in this Article, but in
the assignment of constitutional status to Part III. It must be granted that the formula “social market econ-
omy” was rather bland and a trifle ambivalent (as it was qualified by the reference to the simultaneous
aim of high competitiveness).80 The IGC Draft has further decaffeinated the Article, by means of re-
questing the Union to strive at “a highly competitive social market economy”, and by means of inserting
a specific reference to the objective of “price stability”. It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that
this indicates a further entrenching of the present Union’ definition of its socio-economic model, a proc-
ess that helps further shift the balance in favour of the market dimension, to the detriment of the political
and social dimensions.
D) Cultural community
The Draft speaks to the Union as something more and distinctly different from that of a mere problem-
solving entity. It nevertheless does also, as the problem-solving model presupposes, affirm respect for
national and regional identities, as well as provide safeguards for their retention. 
But the literal tenor of the Draft is not a mere subtle front or veil for something less impressive and
less unique, and which will serve as a mere functional vehicle for and appendix to, a Europe of nation-
states. It goes much further and explicitly depicts the Union as a community of values. The preamble
speaks to the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”, which the Union draws on. This
gives a foundation not only for Europe as idea, but also for a European identity. This sense of identity
takes credence from and is to be rooted in a set of common symbols (Article I-8). Together these can
serve to evoke a sense of Europeanness. 
But the Draft cannot be construed as a vehicle for the forging of a European value community on a
par with that of a nation-state. As was shown above, the Union is set up as a value community based on
a set of provisions that speak to the Union as a community steeped in a set of universal values and prin-
ciples. The preamble tellingly speaks of how the European traditions have given rise to and have helped
propound “the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom,
democracy, equality, and the rule of law”. The preamble speaks as much to what Europe has contributed
73. Affaire C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungsgesellschaft mbH contre Oberbürgermeisterin der
Bundesstadt Bonn, opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, delivered on 18 March, 2004, not yet reported. The case concerned the
conflict between the right to provide services (more specifically, the service of playing a game in a ‘laserdrome’ where
players obtained points when ‘killing’ human targets) and the right to dignity, as interpreted within the German
constitutional tradition. In general, theoretical terms, paragraph 50 of the Opinion is of special interest, as the AG here
hints at the question of the higher abstract value of fundamental rights: “Cependant, il vaudrait la peine de se demander si,
eu égard aux valeurs protégées par les droits de l'homme et les droits fondamentaux, à l'image de la Communauté en tant
que Communauté fondée sur le respect de ces droits et, surtout, à la référence – imposée par l'opinion actuellement
prévalente – à la protection des droits de l'homme en tant que condition de la légitimité de toute forme d'organisation de
l'État, il ne serait pas possible de reconnaître aux droits fondamentaux et aux droits de l'homme une certaine primauté sur
le droit originaire «général». Toutefois, les libertés fondamentales peuvent, au moins dans une certaine mesure,
parfaitement être considérées sur un plan matériel comme des droits fondamentaux: en tant qu'elles énoncent des
interdictions de discrimination par exemple, elles doivent être considérées comme des expressions particulières du principe
général d'égalité . Ainsi, un conflit de normes entre les libertés fondamentales consacrées par le traité et les droits
fondamentaux et droits de l'homme peut, dans certains cas au moins, également être un conflit opposant des droits
fondamentaux.”
74. Case C-384/02, Anklagemyndigheden v Knud Grøngaard Allan Bang, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, of 25
May 2004, not yet reported.
75. Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte: American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial
Tobacco Ltd, supported by: Japan Tobacco Inc. and JT International SA. Opinion delivered on 10 September, 2002, [ECR]
I-11453. Cf. paragraph 106: “In other words, the realisation of the internal market may mean that a particular public
interest – such as here public health – is dealt with at the level of the European Union. In this, the interest of the internal
market is not yet the principal objective of a Community measure. The realisation of the internal market simply determines
the level at which another public interest is safeguarded” (our emphasis).
76. A clear example in that regard would be provided if Finland, after having been forced under the principle of free movement
of goods to reduce the duties on alcoholic beverages, would increase them again in the name of public health, a national
policy objective now sheltered by Article 35 of the Charter.John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez
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to the world, Europe’s outward projection, and to Europe’s responsibilities to the world, as it speaks to
the affirmation of Europe’s identity. Indeed, this combination of inward assertion and outward projection
of moral values is far more reminiscent of a cosmopolitan than of a national sense of community. There
is no reference to an explicit European value basis, neither in the articles nor in the preamble.81 The com-
mon values that the Union evokes are the ones we generally associate with the spirit of constitutional
patriotism. 
To get a better sense of its rights-based cosmopolitan vs. value-communal imprint, we should con-
sider first the inward assertion of values espoused by the Union. Here it is natural to start with clarifying
the relation between the values espoused by the Union and the notion of constitutional patriotism be-
cause this is so central to the rights-based model. Constitutional patriotism as mode of allegiance is such
framed as to elicit support and emotional attachment, precisely because the universalistic principles that
form its core are embedded within a particular context. People’s attachments are derived from the man-
ner in which a set of universal principles are interpreted and entrenched within a particular institutional
setting. The Draft does not spell out a common European context in a cultural sense. There is no refer-
ence to a common language, ethnicity or distinctly European history that these principles are steeped
within. 
The type of community we can discern from the Draft is thus not monolithic, but is better thought
of as a complex, composite community. It could be conceived of as a ‘community of communities’, as
is well expressed in the Union’s motto of “united in diversity”. 
Consistent with this motto the Draft seeks to fuse the universalist value orientation that has marked
the EU from its inception with a set of statements and concrete provisions that speak to the need for the
Union to “respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity…” (I-3.3). The question is whether this also
entails that the Union is foremost about propounding difference and diversity, in other words, that it is
united only in its salutation of difference. 
Article 1-5 stated that: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Constitu-
tion and the national identities of its Member States”. This article underlined that the Union has a strong
nation-state presence, and further that its retention is valuable. However, it is also noteworthy and en-
tirely consistent with the above that it is the institutional over the cultural dimension of national identity
that is emphasized. 
In one reading this can be construed as the Draft propounding constitutional patriotism at the nation-
al level, whilst it actually propounds national diversity at the European level. But it could also be argued
that the result might serve as a restriction on the pursuit of diversity and serve as a de facto further vehicle
of ensuring the inclusiveness necessary to sustain European co-operation. In sum, the inward assertion
of values is consistent with constitutional patriotism but in a ‘thin’ rights-reflexive trapping. In a sense
77. Some of the more than 30 constitutional proposals that have been submitted to the Convention contain citizenship
provisions that could rectify this. See for instance MEP Jo Leinen’s draft proposal entitled Draft Constitution of the
European Union, Brussels: European Parliament, October 2002.
78. It goes without saying that the Charter, preamble included, is part and parcel of the Draft Treaty. However, the Convention
rejected the suggestion made by some members of the Charter Convention of making use of the preamble to the Charter as
preamble to the Draft Constitution and, obviously enough, the Charter is Part II of the Draft Treaty, as there was no
agreement, but open opposition, to its inclusion within the text of Part I.
79. The IGC substituted “non-discrimination” by “equality between men and women”, something which, in our view, has the
positive effect of highlighting the importance of sex equality, while constraining the scope of the inequalities which should
be fought within the legal order of the Union.
80. See Christian Joerges, Social Market Economy as Europe’s Social Model?, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 8/2004,
Florence: European University Institute.
81. The underlying philosophical orientation of the Charter is that of constitutional patriotism (J.E. Fossum, ‘The European
Charter – Between Deep Diversity and Constitutional Patriotism’, in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menéndez, eds.,
The Chartering of Europe: The Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2003). The values listed in the preamble of the Charter (which was retained in the Draft, hence leaving the Draft with two
preambles, one for the whole Constitution and one for the Charter) refer to a conception of the EU as based on a set of
universal principles. Its commitment is to the principles and values of democracy and the rule of law, and not to a set of
specific and uniquely European values. But the German language version of the Charter deviates from the rest with its
reference to Europe’s religious rather than spiritual heritage (cf. J. Schönlau, ‘New Values for Europe? Deliberation,
Compromise, and Coercion in Drafting the Preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in Eriksen et al., ibid, p.
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this is the most genuine reflection of how the rights-based democratic spirit of the common constitutional
traditions has come to permeate European thinking. 
Furthermore, the Union reinforces the rights-based orientation in its outward projection of values.
Whereas the nation-state is janus-faced, the Union’s two faces are far better combined, although in a con-
textualised manner. Consider the provisions for membership. Article I-1 states that: “The Union shall be
open to all European states which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together”. The
referral to European states serves as a clear restriction, whereas the values otherwise referred to are uni-
versal. This provision is also an explication of Union practice, a practice where the Union has strength-
ened the onus on basic rights, the rule of law and democracy, over time (Sjursen and Smith 2001). 
To sum up, in cultural community terms the draft ended up appealing to the same complex of uni-
versality and difference as is found in the most recent treaties. The text of the Draft and its provisions
come closest to the third, rights-based, model. 32
IV. Conclusions
This paper had three main aims, which correspond to its three main parts. First, we developed three main
conceptions of a legitimate European Union and presented the implications that the application of each
such would have on the substantive contents of the Union’s constitution. This allowed us to establish a
set of six constitutional markers, based on the reconstruction and systematisation of the constitutional
claims associated with each of the three conceptions of the Union.82 Second, we offered a description of
the substantive contents of the Draft on four out of these six topics.83 This assumed knowledge of the
actual contents of Treaty law, although at some points it was found convenient to render that explicit,
especially as our reconstruction also has to be innovative, and as it is pursued from a perspective which
is not necessarily part of the mainstream (as on what concerns the analysis of law-making processes in
Union law). This allowed us to get a sense of the main innovations that would result from the entry into
force of the Draft. Third, we sought to establish to which conception of the Union that the contents of
the Draft speak. We did so both in static terms (that is, by considering which conception of the Union is
better captured by the present contents of the Draft) and in dynamic terms (trying to determine what is
the pattern of evolution).
One caveat is particularly called for here, and which pertains in particular to the second model. The
strong evolutionary component embedded in this value-based conception of constitution means that it is
particularly hard to establish whether the constitutional draft properly embodies the core tenets of this
conception of the legitimacy of the EU. To do so properly we would have needed also to focus on what
may be labeled the constitutional support structure, i.e. the strength of European identification and un-
derlying sense of European community. Our analysis did speak to how this document conceives of the
Union as community, and how it projects its relations to the citizens, but our analysis of the Draft did not
yield much in terms of whether this projection will converge with or diverge from the identifications and
communities that make up Europe.
With this necessary proviso, we have reached the following conclusions. First, the Union has clearly
transcended beyond the problem-solving conception, and the Draft underlines this in both symbolic and
substantive terms. It has become practice to substantiate such a claim on the open constitutional character
of the Laeken process, which implies a level of politicisation and procedural democracy that far exceeds
the assumptions of the intergovernmental, neo-functional and regulatory conceptions of the Union. But
by means of considering the different markers that we established in this paper, we are able to set forth
a more grounded and detailed challenge to these conceptions of the Union. The Draft entails a formali-
sation of the norms which allocate competences among the Union and the Member States, the affirma-
tion of direct legitimacy and parliamentary democratic legitimacy as the pillars of the democratic
legitimacy of Union law, the formal incorporation of a catalogue of fundamental rights binding all insti-
tutions acting within the scope of Union law, and the constitutionalisation of key elements of European
identity. This conclusion does not deny the fact that there are many features of the substantive constitu-
tional order to be established by the Draft that will still reflect the Union’s roots in an international or-
ganisation. We have also demonstrated that the Union still retains some elements of a problem-solving
organisation. The key issue is whether the Draft can be taken in such a direction as to ostracise these. 
82. We are very conscious of the tentative character of the exercise, and also of the need to show the empirical salience of such
markers (for example, by documenting their use in the Laeken Convention).
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Second, and related to this, we have tried to give some sense of the direction of change. Our main
finding is that the Draft does not merely simplify or solidify the Union in its present status but is evoca-
tive of an entity that is still very much in motion. We have established that the most appropriate direction
is from problem-solving to either value-based or rights-based polity. In that regard, we found that the
substantive contents of the Draft speak more clearly to the rights-based conception of the Union than to
the value-based one. This is reflected in the combined willingness to formalise and further enrich the
common institutional structures and foundational values of the Union, while retaining a complex, feder-
al-type political structure, and which is also still quite different from what would be the case in a nation-
state building process.
Our finding to the effect that the Draft foremost embraces the rights-based model should not be con-
strued as a statement to the effect that values do not count or that the Union is not overly concerned with
values. Rather, as we have tried to show, it underlines the forward-looking and still experimentative
character of the Union, as a particularly apt test case of how institutional development can foster a sense
of community where the requisite ingredients that communitarians always stress are patently not present.
The findings on this process that is unfolding in Europe will have deep implications for the world. What
is also manifestly clear is that current European developments, in their non-state and hence more fragile
nature, also are critically dependent on global developments. Perhaps this fact itself is testimony to the
underlying cosmopolitan urge that is so deeply entrenched in this European project. 